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Abstract 
 
In this paper, I investigate whether the surge in “cov-lite” bonds can be attributed to the 
increased participation of Bond Funds in the U.S. Corporate Bond Market. Combining data 
from FISD and Morningstar, I show that bonds issued in periods of low interest rates tend to 
have fewer covenants. I find no evidence of bonds owned to a greater extent by Bond funds, to 
have fewer covenants. Nonetheless, I confirm that funds increase their holdings in corporate 
bonds to bonds with less than mean covenants by 3.45% following a one-unit increase in the 
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1. Introduction 
 
Corporate bonds constitute a very important source of financing for non-financial firms 
worldwide. As of the end of 2019, the total amount outstanding of corporate debt issued 
through bonds reached its historical maximum value of USD 13.5 trillion in real terms, as 
reported by OECD (Çelik, Demirtas and Isaksson 2020). Underpinning this all-time high value 
is the increasing issuance of corporate bonds after the financial crisis of 2008. In the United 
States, the annual average issuance of corporate bonds increased by 58.9%, from USD 852.2 
during the period between 2000 and 2008, to USD 1 353.9 billion from 2009 onwards (Figure 
1). The economic cycle precedent to the financial crisis of 2008 is characterized by all-time 
low interest rates and expansionary monetary policies from major central banks. Firms are then 
increasingly incentivized to issue new debt to benefit from lower borrowing costs.  
 
A growing concern for regulators is the gradual deterioration in the credit quality of corporate 
debt. As reported by OECD (Çelik et al. 2020), the share of High Yield (HY) bonds in global 
bond issuance has been above the 20% for the past 10 years, with exception of 2018. A more 
in-depth analysis by the authors within the Investment Grade (IG) category exhibited a large 
rise in the issuance of BBB rated bonds. In 2008, BBB rated bonds accounted for 30% of all 
IG bond issues. In 2019, BBB rated bonds represented 50.9% of all IG issues. In the U.S. 
Corporate Bond Market, credit deterioration is likewise significant. The annual average 
percentage of HY bonds in the total of non-convertible bond issues increased by 61.9%, from 
11.4% during the period of 2000 and 2008, to 18.4% in the period after 2009 (Figure 2).  
 
Hand in hand with the decline in overall bond quality is the increased risk appetite of 
institutional investors. When interest rates are low, asset managers take on more risk to 
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guarantee returns to their clients. This includes foregoing covenant rights. Covenants are legal 
clauses included in a debt contract to prevent the issuer from undertaking certain actions that 
may be detrimental to bondholders. Çelik et al. (2020) document a significant shrink in the 
“covenant protection index”1 for non-IG bonds issued in the U.S. by non-financial firms. This 
index decreased from 47%, in 2000, to 38%, in 2019. For IG bonds, covenant protection 
remains unchanged, despite the rise in the issuance of BBB rated bonds.  
 
Another shared concern among practitioners is the increased holdings of Investment Funds in 
the Corporate Bond Market. In 2000, U.S. Investment Funds accounted for 10% of total 
domestic ownership of U.S. corporate bonds. This value peaked to 27.7% in 2018. Data is from 
OECD (Çelik et al. 2020). Investment Funds have rating-based investment mandates. As such, 
potential downgrades of in-demand BBB rated bonds, in an economic downturn, may preclude 
certain investment vehicles from holding bonds that are rated BB+ or below. Consequent sell-
offs can threaten financial stability due to the illiquid nature of HY bonds and the open-ended 
structure of mutual funds.  
 
Motivated by the increased interest and rising concerns for credit quality deterioration in the 
U.S. Corporate Bond Market, I seek to answer the following questions: What’s the impact of 
interest rates and bond market liquidity on issue-level debt covenants? Does the increased 
demand of mutual funds for corporate bonds shifted the market towards more issuer friendly 
terms? Do funds allocate a higher percentage of their holdings to bonds with less covenants in 
periods of low interest rates and high liquidity? Do funds that allocate a higher percentage of 
their holdings to bonds with less covenants perform better and attract more inflows? 
 
1 The Covenant Protection Index is a commonly used metric to access covenant protection (See Billet et al. 2007, 
and Çelik et al. 2020). It is obtained by dividing the number of covenants in a bond by all conceivable covenants. 
The lower this index, the weaker the covenant protection. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
Most empirical literature on the determinants of bond covenants is based on the sample of 
publicly offered U.S. bonds reported by FISD. Smith and Warner (1979) is the classical 
reference for the construction of covenant variables. Smith and Warner identify four main 
sources of conflict between bondholders and shareholders: dividend payment, claim dilution, 
asset substitution, and underinvestment. According to the type of activity restricted, they 
categorize covenants in four groups: investment covenants, dividend covenants, financing 
covenants, and bonding covenants. Reisel (2014) follows this covenant construction to show 
that restrictions on financing and on investment activities reported by FISD lower the cost of 
debt. This evidence is consonant with the role of debt covenants in preventing managerial 
opportunism. More recently, Daniel, Miguel, and Beatriz (2018) have identified an increase in 
the number of independent directors on firms’ boards of 24% after a covenant breach. As 
further documented, these renewed boards are more likely to adopt creditor-friendly policies, 
including dividend cuts and operational risk reduction. Higher yields thus come at a price! 
 
In spite of the literature results supporting the role of covenants in optimal financial 
contracting, creditor protection has been deteriorating in the last decade, as extensively 
documented in my introduction. Credit deterioration is not limited to the Corporate Bond 
Market. In fact, most published academic papers focus on the Leveraged Loan Market. This 
gap in the literature may be due to a common belief that bond covenants, due to their wide-
dispersed investor base, are nearly irrelevant (Kahan and Tuckman 1993, and Verde 1999).  
 
Credit deterioration in the Leveraged Loan Market constitutes the object of study by Becker 
and Ivashina (2016). In the 1Q of 2009, “cov-lite” loans were nearly inexistent. In 2015, the 
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fraction of “cov-lite”2 loans was sharply above at 70%. The concurrent compression in loan 
spreads, corroborates, in the authors’ view, the theory that this phenomenon has been driven 
by borrowers. Empirical results from the study, evidence that this development can be highly 
attributed to changes in the investor base for leveraged loans. 
 
The previous paper flags for the structural changes in the demand for leveraged loans. Çelik et 
al. (2020) do a similar job for corporate bonds. A deeper look into the holders of U.S. corporate 
debt is thus required. Specifically, I search for the changing incentives of Bond Funds. 
 
A research paper by Choi and Kronlund (2017) on “reaching for yield” (RFY) across U.S. 
Bond Funds shows that funds are incentivized to forego control rights in order to boost yields. 
Coefficients estimates of future fund flows on active shift in “RFY” are positive and 
statistically significant. The results remain unchanged when the authors control for past 
performance, evidencing that investors may have a preference for higher yield funds 
independent of past returns. Time-series regressions of “RFY” indicate that when interest rates 
are low and market liquidity is high, funds are further incentivized to invest in HY securities. 
Such results are consonant with fewer investment opportunities available in the market. 
 
As to my knowledge, I add to the existing literature novel findings on the determinants of bond 
covenants. Most empirical designs on covenants are well summarized by the Poisson model 
proposed by Brockman et al. (2018), to which I add new fund-level and macroeconomic control 
variables. I also contribute to the existing literature on fund flows and returns, by running time-
series regressions of asset allocation to bonds with less than mean covenants. 
 
2 “Cov-lite” contracts are defined by Becker and Ivashina (2016) as equivalent to incurrence provisions. “Cov-
lite” contracts do not necessarily have fewer covenants according to the authors’ definition scope. In my paper, 
however, “cov-lite” contracts are used interchangeably with bonds having fewer covenant provisions.   
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3. Hypotheses Formulation 
 
In this section, I define my research hypotheses by specifying the economic relationship I 
expect to obtain between the explanatory variables and the explained variable. Based on the 
literature reviewed above, I formulate four main hypotheses, two of which are at the bond-level 
and the others are at the fund-level. Hypotheses at the bond-level have as a dependent variable 
the number of covenants in a bond. Hypotheses at the fund-level have as a dependent variable 
the fund asset allocation to bonds with less than mean covenants, net inflows, or returns. 
 
Hypothesis 1 (Bond-Level): There is an increase in the issuance of bonds with fewer 
covenants when interest rates are low and market liquidity is high.  
 
The construction of the first hypothesis is based on the increased risk-taking by Investors when 
interest rates are low and market liquidity is high. Choi and Kronlund (2017) show that funds 
tilt their portfolios towards lower-rated, long maturity. and “HY-lite” bonds during these 
periods. As such, I expect an increase in the issuance of HY bonds with fewer covenants when 
interest rates are low and market liquidity is high, ceteris paribus.  
 
I test H1 by regressing the number of covenants on the yield slope, default spread, liquidity in 
the U.S. Corporate Bond Market, and a set of issue-level and country-level control variables. 
These regressors are constructed following Choi and Kronlund (2017). I introduce, however, a 
different measure to account for liquidity. This measure corresponds to the average daily 
trading volume in the U.S. Corporate Bond Market, downloaded from the Securities Industry 
and Financial Markets Association. An identical approach is to use the turnover of bonds 
(Anderson et al. (2017), Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012), and Friewald et al. (2012)).  
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Hypothesis 2 (Bond-Level): Increased ownership of Corporate Bonds by Corporate Bond 
Mutual Funds predicts less covenants in place for a bond.  
 
The construction of this second hypothesis is based on the increased participation of Bond 
Funds in the Corporate Bond Market. As documented by Becker and Ivashina (2016), covenant 
provisions are less attractive in wide-dispersed investor bases. Moreover, Mutual Funds are 
incentivized to take on excessive risk to improve their relative ranking (Huddart 1999). Feroli 
et al. (2014) pinpoint that “the more [active investors] try to avoid underperforming, the harder 
any particular [active investor] must try to avoid the fate of underperforming”. I then expect 
looser covenants for bonds owned to a greater extent by Corporate Bond Mutual Funds.  
 
In testing H2, I regress the total number of covenants on the percentage of the bond that is 
owned by U.S. Corporate Bond Mutual Funds and a set of control variables.  
 
Hypothesis 3 (Fund-Level): Funds allocate a higher percentage of their holdings to bonds 
with less than mean covenants when interest rates are low and market liquidity is high. 
 
In this third hypothesis, I access how much the interest rate environment and market liquidity 
explain the share of a fund’s holdings that is allocated to bonds with less than mean covenants. 
The motivations are the ones pinpointed for H1. I expect funds to hold more bonds with less 
than mean covenants in periods of low interest rates and high liquidity, ceteris paribus. 
 
To test H3, I regress the percentage of a fund’s holdings that is allocated to bonds with less 
than mean covenants on the yield slope, default spread, liquidity in the U.S. Corporate Bond 
Market and a set of fund-level control variables. 
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Hypothesis 4 (Fund-Level): Increased asset allocation to bonds with less than mean 
covenants predicts greater fund returns and more inflows from Investors. 
 
In my last hypothesis, I investigate whether funds that allocate a higher percentage of their 
holdings to bonds with less than mean covenants experience greater returns and attract more 
inflows. Agreeing on looser covenants is a form of risk-taking. As such, I expect funds with a 
larger asset allocation to bonds with less than mean covenants to have a better performance in 
the short-term ceteris paribus. On a risk-adjusted basis, however, these funds underperform a 
passive benchmark (Huddart 1999). Likewise, Patel et al. (1993) report a positive relationship 
between fund inflows and fund past recent performance. Choi and Kronlund (2017) define it 
as a “return-chasing channel” and distinguish it from a “catering channel”, which specifies that 
investors may have a preference for high yielding funds independent of past returns. My focus 
is then on investigating the indirect effect of bond covenants, via higher yields, on future flows 
independent of past returns. 
 
In testing H4, I undertake two separate tests. In my first model, I regress monthly fund returns 
on the asset allocation to bonds with less than mean covenants, lagged by one quarter. On my 
second model, I regress quarterly fund flows on the asset allocation to bonds with less than 
mean covenants, past flows, past returns, squared past returns and a set of fund-level control 
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4. The Data  
 
To study credit quality deterioration in the U.S Corporate Bond Market, I analyze the following 
databases: (1) the Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD) for detailed information 
on publicly offered U.S. bonds, such as the types of covenants in place and the rating history 
of the bond, (2) Morningstar for holdings data of U.S. Fixed Income funds, (3) the Securities 
Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIMFA) to collect data on the U.S. Fixed Income 
Market, namely the average daily trading volume, (4) The Federal Reserve Bank of ST. Louis 
for data on the term structure of the interest rates, including the yield level and the yield slope, 
and for data on the default spread, and (5) World Bank to access data on development 
indicators, such as GDP Growth (annual %) and Inflation (annual %).  
 
4.1. FISD - U.S. Bonds Data 
 
I have accessed FISD database through Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). FISD has 
a comprehensive coverage of publicly offered U.S. bonds. It contains cross-sectional data on 
the characteristics of over 450,000 U.S. bonds issued between 1950 and 2019. The variables 
included in the data frame and directly applied in this empirical research are the following: 
 
• Identification Variables: Issue ID and Complete CUSIP. These variables are of particular 
relevance when linking each issue’s data among different data frames. 
• Issue Information: Bond Type, Offering Date, Country Domicile, Industry Group, 
Offering Amount, Coupon, Maturity, Rating, Security Level.  
• Restrictive Variables: Restrictive variables represent covenants that restrict borrower’s 
actions and are coded with either Y, indicating that the covenant is in place, or N, indicating 
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that the covenant is not in place. In the variable construction section, I describe which FISD 
variables are considered to represent a certain type of covenant. 
 
To ensure the validity and quality of the data, I have excluded from the original data frame all 
bonds issued prior to 1989 and for which no offering date, offering amount, maturity date, 
coupon, or covenant information is provided. The same approach is followed by Miller and 
Reisel (2012), and Brockman, Ghoul, Guedhami, and Zheng (2018). Finally, I narrow the 
sample to issues of bond type CDEB (US Corporate Debentures), USBN (US Corporate Bank 
Note), CMTN (US Corporate MTN), and CMTZ (US Corporate MTN Zero). I do so since I am 
mainly focused on studying credit quality deterioration in corporate bonds with no complex 
optionalities. Finally, I only consider bonds issued between the period between 2003 and 2019. 
It is within this range that the holdings data from Morningstar is reported.  
 
The above procedures resulted in a final sample of 17 530 bonds issued over the period between 
2003 and 2019. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics, such as mean, median, and standard 
deviation for each variable. Consistent with the data reported by Çelik et al. (2020), the annual 
average of bonds issued in the sample increased by 38% between the period before and after 
the financial crisis of 2008. This surge was largely driven by the increasing issuance of HY 
bonds. A more in-depth analysis within the IG category shows that the issuance of AAA rated 
bonds in the sample decreased massively, contrasting with the significant increase in the 
issuance of BBB- bonds. Consonant with Billet et al. (2007), and Brockman et al. (2018), the 
majority of bonds issued in the two sample periods are senior and mature within 5 to 15 years.  
Finally, bonds in the later sample display higher offering amounts and lower coupon rates.  
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4.2. Morningstar – Holdings Data of U.S. Fixed Income Funds 
 
The Morningstar database contains panel data on bond holdings of over 1,500 U.S. open-end 
Fixed Income Funds, covering the period from 2003 to 2019. The data includes both surviving 
and dead funds, preventing survivorship bias from distorting the results obtained. The variables 
included in the database and directly applied in this empirical research are the following: 
 
• Identification Variables: Fund Id and CUSIP. Fund Id is of particular relevance when 
linking each fund’s data among different data frames from Morningstar. 
• Fund Information: Inception Date, Expense Ratio, Size, Morningstar Institutional 
Category, Share Class, Net Flows and Returns. 
• Holdings Information: Reporting Date, Holding Type ID, Value Weighting and Value 
Number of Share. Value Weighting corresponds to the percentage of the fund portfolio a 
specific holding represents. Value Number of Share equals the amount in dollars of the 
holding.  
 
To inspect the integrity of the holdings data, I start by summing up all the holdings of a fund 
id for the same reporting date. Invalid descriptive statistics have led me to identify holdings 
with negative market values being reported as positive weights. As such, I’ve converted the 
weights to negative where the market value of the holding was negative, obtaining more 
accurate results. I have then excluded all the funds whose holdings did not sum up to close 100 
on the same date. Consonant with the data cleaning of FISD, I then narrow the original sample 
to holdings of type B (Corporate Bond) and 5 (Bond-Corporate Bond), to work only with plain 
vanilla corporate bonds. I organize the data by quarter, to ensure the results do not get biased 
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towards funds that report their holdings with more frequency. Finally, I only consider funds 
for which there is matching information from FISD. 
 
The above procedures resulted in a final sample of 1 241 funds. Table 2 present summary 
statistics of the most important variables employed in the analysis. All fund characteristics 
reported at the share class level are computed as the size-weighted average of all share classes 
for the same fund. Based on Morningstar Institutional Category3, I distinguish HY funds from 
Others. From Panel A of Table 2, HY funds allocate on average 84.64% of their holdings to 
corporate bonds, well above the 38.45% invested by Other funds. In reverse, HY funds allocate 
a smaller fraction of their corporate bond holdings to bonds with less than mean covenants. 
These results are consonant with HY funds investing primarily in lower-rated bonds, which 
often have more covenants. An alternative view of the data by sample period, in Panel B of 
Table 2, evidences the increasing popularity of Bond Funds. The average size of the sample 
funds more than doubled in the last decade. Finally, the sample funds have performed worse 
in the last decade, as has the Barclays U.S. Aggregate Corporate Bond Index. 
 
5. Dependent Variable Construction – Bond Covenants 
 
The main dependent variable of this study is the total number of covenants in place for a bond. 
FISD reports over 50 variables on bond covenants. bondholder protective, issuer and subsidiary 
restrictive covenants (Qi et al. 2011). The last two are identified in WRDS query form as 
“Additional Issuer Information”. In this section, I describe the methodology used to classify 
bond covenants reported by FISD.  
 
3 Morningstar segments Taxable Bond Funds in 22 categories based on the duration and credit quality of the 
funds’ portfolio. Funds classified as High Yield Bond invest primarily in low quality bonds, namely unrated 
securities. 
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In my literature review, I have cited Smith and Warner (1979) for their pioneer work on 
covenants. I have named the four sources of bondholder-shareholder conflict, which constitute 
the basis for the categorization of debt covenants. I now describe each one in more detail. 
 
• Dividend Payment: The firm finances the increase in dividend payments by reducing 
investment (aka, “Milking the Firm”). In the limit scenario, the firm is liquidated to pay 
dividends, and bondholders are left with worthless claims (Smith and Warner 1979). 
• Claim Dilution: The firm issues additional debt of equal or higher priority. Hence, the 
firm’s probability of default increases, and the total assets available to unsecured creditors 
in bankruptcy decreases (Nash et al. 2003, and Brockman et al. 2018).  
• Asset Substitution: Management substitutes safer with riskier projects (Nash et al. 2003). 
Debtholders are due to receive a regular fixed schedule of payments into the future, and so 
do not benefit from an increasing variance in the firm’s value. 
• Underinvestment: Equity holders reject positive NPV projects because debtholders 
capture most of the gains from the investment. 
 
The above agency problems are intensified when the firm is near financial distress, i.e., when 
the firm’s operating cash flows are known to be insufficient to meet its upcoming obligations 
(Nash et al. 2003). Bondholders are then more likely to demand restrictive covenants the closer 
the firm is to financial distress. 
 
As to the methodology, I follow the 22 covenant dummies construction proposed by Qi, Roth, 
and Wald (2011). According to the type of activity restricted, and respective conflict of 
interests mitigated, I group covenants reported by FISD in eight major categories, as follows:  
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Payment Restrictions: Prevent managers from value transfer to equity holders in the form of 
dividends, by restricting payouts. FISD Variables: (1) dividends_related_payments_is; (2) 
dividends_related_payments_sub; and (3) restricted_payments. 
 
Borrowing Restrictions: Protect bondholders from having their claims on the assets of the 
firm diluted. It does so by limiting the firm’s ability to issue additional debt of equal or higher 
priority. Borrowing Restrictions include: (1) Liens Restrictions; (2) Issuer Indebtedness 
Restrictions; and (3) Subsidiary Indebtedness Restrictions. FISD Variables: (1.1) liens_is; (1.2) 
liens_sub; (1.3) negative_pledge_covenant; (2.1) subordinated_debt_issuance; (2.2) 
senior_debt_issuance; (2.3) indebtedness_is; (2.4) funded_debt_is; (2.5) sales_leasback_is; 
(2.6) leverage_test_is; (3.1) indebtedness_sub; (3.2) leverage_test_sub; (3.3) 
funded_debt_sub; (3.4) sales_leaseback_sub; and (3.5) subsidiary_guarantee. 
 
Asset and Investment Restrictions: Protect bondholders from risk-shifting expropriation, by 
limiting managers freedom to take on risky investments. Like Qi et. al (2011), I further segment 
this category into: (1) Asset Sales; (2) Capital Expenditures; (3) Affiliate Transactions. FISD 
Variables: (1.1) asset_sale_clause; (1.2) sale_assets; (1.3) sale_xfer_asset_unrestricted; (2.1) 
investments; and (2.2) investments_unrestricted_subs; (3.1) transaction_affiliates. 
 
Stock Issuance Restrictions: Prevents the firm from issuing additional common stock, 
preferred stock, or other stock transfers. FISD Variables: (1) stock_issuance; (2) 
stock_issuance_issuer; (3) preferred_stock_issuance; (4) stock_transfer_sale_disp. 
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Default-Related Covenants: Allow bondholders to trigger default and to accelerate their debt, 
if an event of default occurs under any other debt of the company. FISD Variables: (1) 
cross_default; and (2) cross_acceleration. 
 
Anti-Takeover-Related Restrictions: Protects bondholders from an unwanted takeover, by 
conceding to them the right of selling the issue back to the issuer upon a change of control in 
the firm. FISD Variables: (1.1) consolidation_merger; (1.2) change_control_put_provisions. 
 
Profit Maintenance Covenants: Requires the firm to keep sound financial ratios. In case of 
non-compliance with these financial metrics, the issuer is either prevented from undertaking a 
certain action (“Incurrence Covenants”), such as issuing new debt, or the lender is given the 
right to trigger certain bond provisions (“Maintenance Covenants”). FISD Variables: (1.1) 
maintenance_net_worth; (1.2) declining_net_worth; (1.3) net_earnings_test_issuance; (1.4) 
fixed_charge_coverage_is; and (1.5) fixed_charge_coverage_sub. 
 
Rating Trigger Covenants: Protects bondholders from credit rating declines by triggering a 
bondholder put provision. FISD Variables: (1.1) rating_decline_trigger_put. 
 
All in all, I consider 37 FISD variables in my covenant analysis. I start by creating a covenant 
frequency variable to count the total number of restrictive covenants in a bond. From there, I 
construct the “covenant protection index”. I also design a covenant dummy variable taking the 
value of 1 in case the bond has more than mean covenants, and 0 otherwise. This dummy is of 
particular relevance for the logistic regressions on bond covenants and for the fund-level 
regressions. In the following section, I describe the characteristics of the outlined covenant 
variables.  
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5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 3 reports the incidence of covenants by category for the full sample. 99.3% of the bonds 
have at least one covenant. The average number of covenants is 6.75, with a maximum value 
of 22 covenants reported. The most frequently used categories of covenants are, by descending 
order, anti-takeover restrictions (91%), asset sales restrictions (77.9%), default-related 
covenants (75.1%), and borrowing restrictions (73%). On the opposite end, rating trigger 
covenants (0.9%), and investment restrictions (1.7%) are rarely used. The incidence of 
covenants in the sample is higher than documented by Billet et al. (2007), and Qi et al. (2011). 
 
For time-series analysis, I report the average number of covenants and their incidence by 
category in different years. Figure 3 shows that the average number of covenants across years 
for the full sample is quite volatile and lacks any insightful pattern. As such, I break down the 
data into IG and HY bonds. The latter do exhibit a diminishing trend of average covenants. 
Furthermore, HY bonds present higher average covenants than IG bonds. As documented by 
the SEC’s Office of Investor Education and Advocacy (2013), HY bonds often have more 
covenants than IG bonds, as they generally present a higher risk of default. However, as 
documented by the same source, when the demand for HY bonds is high, bond issuers gain a 
stronger footing when issuing debt, and may include fewer covenant protections. Figures 4 & 
5 display the declining frequency of the various types of covenants.  
 
A more robust metric to access credit quality deterioration is the “covenant protection index”. 
Figure 6 shows that the level of protection granted to HY bondholders has deteriorated sharply. 
Concomitant with expectations of increased short-term interest rates in the future, the covenant 
protection index temporarily re-surged between 2009 and 2014.  
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6. Independent Variables Construction 
 
The main variables of interest in this study are the Interest Rate Environment, Market Liquidity, 
and Funds participation in the U.S. Bond Market. In this section, I first detail the procedures 
followed to construct these variables’ proxies and then conduct a univariate analysis to gauge 
the expected effect the variables have on the dependent variable. 
 
6.1. Yield Curve and Market Liquidity 
 
In studying the Interest Rate Environment, I examine the yield slope and default spread. Data 
on yield curve rates is disclosed on a daily basis by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. As 
such, I link interest rates to bond covenants in FISD based on the offering date of the issue. A 
bond issued in November of 2003 is attributed the yield slope4 and default spread5 prevalent 
in that date. I apply the same methodology for market liquidity. Historical data on the average 
daily trading volume in the U.S. Corporate Bond market, which I use to proxy market liquidity, 
is reported annually by SIMFA. Hence, I merge the data based on the offering year of the issue.  
 
Plotting together the yield slope and default spread with the annual average of bond covenants 
(Figure 7) suggests that there might be a positive relationship between the variables. The 
opposite is found for trading volume (Figure 8). A more granular analysis of the data using 
Kernel Density Estimates exhibits a significant, but very weak, linear relationship between the 
yield slope, default spread and trading volume, and the number of covenants in place for a 
bond. The estimates obtained are all significant and of, respectively, 0.01, -0.03, and -0.11. 
 
4 The yield slope is computed as the difference between the 30-year Treasury Rate and 1-year Treasury Rate. 
5 The default spread equals the difference between the effective yield of the BBB Corporate Index and AAA 
Corporate Index. 
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6.2. Funds Participation in the U.S Corporate Bond Market 
 
To analyze funds participation in the U.S. Corporate Bond Market, I add a new variable to the 
data frame called fund weight in bond. This variable captures the percentage of a bond held by 
each sample fund. It is obtained by dividing the quantity of the holding in 1 000$ by the bond 
outstanding amount at a certain date. Two issues arise from the data. First, FISD reports the 
bond outstanding amount for an effective date, i.e., no historical data is recorded. As such, I 
proxy the prevalent outstanding amount, which rarely changes for a bond, by the offering 
amount. Second, the amount in dollars of a bond held by a fund might change over time. This 
occurrence can be easily observed in the data. Hence, I query the holdings data for each fund 
and do the arithmetic average of the time-series data on the respective holdings by cusip. At 
last, I sum all the fund weight in bond for each bond and obtain the share of the bond that is 
held by Bond Funds from Morningstar.  
 
Contrary to what was initially expected in H2, fund weight in bond appears to be positively 
correlated with the number of covenants in a bond (Figure 9). A valid explanation can be the 
increasing custody of HY bonds by the sample funds. Nonetheless, when segmenting the 
sample to HY bonds only, the Kernel Density Estimate remains positive (0.31) and significant.  
 
6.3. Asset Allocation to Bonds with Less than mean covenants 
 
Allocation to bonds with less than mean covenants is used both as a dependent and independent 
variable in the fund-level regressions. In constructing this variable, I start by creating two 
separate, albeit identical, data frames. The first presents quarterly data on the percentage of 
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each fund’s holdings that are allocated to corporate bonds with more than mean covenants. It 
is obtained by first querying the original holdings database to corporate bonds with at least 7 
covenants, and then grouping the data by fund Id and reporting date. The same procedures are 
used to create the second data frame, which contains quarterly data on the percentage of each 
fund’s holdings that are allocated to bonds with less than mean covenants. I then merge back 
the two individual data frames. Finally, I re-scale the weights to capture the share of corporate 
bond holdings, instead of overall holdings, with less than mean covenants. 
 
Figure 10 exhibits quarterly data on the asset allocation to bonds with less than mean 
covenants. On average, funds have been allocating a smaller fraction of their holdings to bonds 
with less than mean covenants. Such tendency seems to contradict H3 that funds are neglecting 
covenants in their debt contracts. It is premature to conclude that. These results might be biased 
towards the increasing ownership of HY bonds by the sample funds. Thus the importance of 
conducting a multivariate analysis, where all control variables are added. 
 
7. Empirical Design 
 
I now describe the econometric methods used to test the hypotheses stated in the Hypotheses 
Formulation. I further specify the sort of equations I estimate.  
 
7.1. Poisson Regression (Bond-Level) 
 
To test the two initial hypotheses at the bond-level, I use a Poisson Regression. Poisson 
regression is the most commonly used econometric method in empirical studies on bond 
covenants (Billet et al. 2007, and Brockman et al. 2018). As argued by Jeffrey Wooldridge 
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(2012), the normality distribution assumption does not hold for count variables and, as such, a 
Poisson regression should be used instead of a linear regression model.  
 
The Poisson Regression I construct to relate the number of covenants in place for a bond with 
the Interest Rate Environment, Corporate Bond Market Liquidity, and Funds Participation in 
the U.S. Corporate Bond Market, looks as follows:  
 
𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠 = 	𝛼! +	𝛼"𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒 + 𝛼#𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 +	𝛼$𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 +
	𝛼%𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑_𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡_𝑖𝑛_𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑	 +	𝛼&𝐼𝐿𝑉 +	𝛼'𝐶𝐿𝑉 + ℰ        (1) 
 
The dependent variable, Covenants, is a count variable indicating the total number of covenants 
in a bond. The independent variables of interest are the yield slope, default spread, trading 
volume, and fund weight in bond. Following Brockman et al. (2018), I add to the equation 
issue-level controls (Offering Amount, Maturity, Coupon, and Rating) and country-level 
controls (GDP Growth and Inflation). Table 4 describes each variable units of measurement. 
 
7.2. OLS Regressions (Fund-Level) 
 
In testing the last two hypotheses at the fund-level, I use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). In all 
model specifications, the dependent variable is of continuous nature. I then formulate the 
following estimated multiple regression equations: 
 
𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝑡𝑜	𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑠	𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ	𝐿𝑒𝑠𝑠	𝑇ℎ𝑎𝑛	𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛	𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠 = 𝛼"𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒 +
𝛼#𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 +	𝛼$𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 +	𝛼%𝐻𝑌𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 +	𝛼&𝐹𝐿𝑉 + 		ℰ                           (2) 
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𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑	𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 =
	𝛼"𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝑡𝑜	𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑠	𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ	𝐿𝑒𝑠𝑠	𝑇ℎ𝑎𝑛	𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛	𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠()*+.-./)0*) + 𝛼#𝐹𝐿𝑉 + 	ℰ	   (3) 
 
𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑	𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠 = 	𝛼"𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝑡𝑜	𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑠	𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ	𝐿𝑒𝑠𝑠	𝑇ℎ𝑎𝑛	𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛	𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠()*+.-./)0*) +
𝛼#𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠(/102*/)3+4 +	𝛼$𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠()*+.-./)0*) +	𝛼%(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠()*+.-./)0*))# + 𝛼&𝐹𝐿𝑉 + 	ℰ 
                        (4) 
 
The above regressions have as main variable of interest allocation to bonds with less than mean 
covenants. In equation 2, the former is used as a dependent variable, to study how it changes 
with the Interest Rate Environment, Corporate Bond Market Liquidity, and Morningstar Rating 
Category “High Yield Bond”. Additional fund-level control variables include Size, Expense 
Ratio, and Net Flows. In equations 3 and 4, allocation to bonds with less than mean covenants 
is used, instead, as an independent variable. All variables of the former two regressions are 
lagged by one quarter. In lagging the variables, I have carefully sorted and queried the data by 
date and fundid before applying pandas.shift() or pandas.rolling() functions. Table 5 describes 
each variable units of measurement. 
 
7.3. Checking for Multicollinearity 
 
The low Pearson correlation values among the key regression variables, all below the absolute 
value of 0.5, indicate that the OLS estimates are unbiased towards multicollinearity. A 
complementary diagnostic tool of multicollinearity includes the variance inflation factor (VIF). 
Midi and Bagheri (2010) specify that a VIF between 5 and 10 indicates moderate collinearity. 
All the VIF values obtained, in each model specification, are well below this range, further 
evidencing that neither regressors suffer from multicollinearity. 
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8. Empirical Results 
 
H1: Does the number of covenants increases with interest rates and market liquidity?  
 
Table 6 reports the coefficients from the Poisson regression, where the dependent variable is 
the total number of covenants, and the independent variables of concern are the yield slope, 
default spread, trading volume, and fund weight in bond. The Likelihood Ratio test indicates 
that the regressors are jointly statistically significant across all model specifications. Standard 
errors are clustered at the firm-level to ensure the observations are independent and identically 
distributed (IID).  
 
Regression (1) of Table 6, which does not include control variables, shows coefficients for 
the yield slope and trading volume of, respectively, 0.05 and -0.29. These Poisson estimates 
are interpreted as the difference between the log of expected counts for a one-unit change in 
the regressor, i.e., 𝛽5 = log 	(𝑢67") − log	(𝑢6). To improve the readability of the results, I 
exponentiate the coefficients to obtain the incidence rate ratio (IRR). The IRR of the Yield 
Slope is 1.05, which means that a 1% decrease in the yield slope reduces the number of 
covenants by 5%. Regressions (2) and (3) add to the model, respectively, issue-level and 
country-level variables, as well as control for industry-effects. The results obtained remain 
unchanged in magnitude and significance across all variables, with exception of the trading 
volume. The signs of the controls are as expected. The higher the rating number assigned to the 
bond, i.e., the worse the bond rating, the larger the expected number of covenants. Moreover, 
reported estimates of GDP Growth are often positive (Brockman et al. 2018). Increased growth 
opportunities have been shown to rise covenant protection (Billet et al. 2007). 
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In Regressions (4) and (5), I re-do the Poisson regression for HY and IG bonds. The p-values 
obtained for the yield slope and default spread are below 1% and, as such, the null hypothesis 
is rejected. The coefficient of log trading volume for HY bonds is negative but statistically 
insignificant. On the other hand, the coefficient of log trading volume for IG bonds is positive 
and significant. The latter results suggest that the negative relationship between trading volume 
and number of covenants is better captured when filtering the sample to HY bonds only. 
 
Contrary to what was initially expected, the default spread estimates are negative and 
significant in all model specifications of Table 6, with exception of IG bonds. Such results 
may be due to the evidenced positive relation between “cov-lite” bonds and credit premiums 
(Wei 2005, and Reisel 2014). When creditor protection is higher, bondholders demand lower 
yields. As such, the hypothesized effect of default spread on bond covenants might get offset 
by the former relationship.  
 
H2: Does increased ownership of corporate bonds by Corporate Bond Mutual Funds 
predicts fewer covenants in place for a bond? 
 
In all model specifications, the coefficient estimates of fund weight in bond are positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. From Table 6, the IRR is 1.004, which means that a 
10% increase in the ownership of corporate bonds by Bond Funds, increases the expected 
number of covenants by 4%. These findings reject the belief that current diminishing covenants 
have been directly induced by Bond Funds demand. As documented by Kahan and Tuckman 
(1993), the terms of public bonds are defined between the issuer and its investment bank. Public 
investors have no direct influence on the negotiation of debt covenants, as do private lenders. 
This sheds some light on the low correlation evidenced between the former variables. 
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H3: Do Bond Funds allocate a higher percentage of their holdings to bonds with less than 
mean covenants when interest rates are low and market liquidity high? 
 
Table 7 reports estimates from the OLS regression, where the dependent variable is allocation 
to bonds with less than mean covenants, and the independent variables of interest are the yield 
slope, default spread, and trading volume. The F-test confirms that the variables are jointly 
statistically significant. Standard errors are clustered at the fund-level.  
 
All the coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. Supporting H3, the coefficients 
for the yield slope and log trading volume are, respectively, -3.45 and 4.21. As such, for each 
one-unit increase in the yield slope, funds allocate, on average, less 3.45% of their holdings in 
corporate bonds to bonds with less than mean covenants. As in the bond-level regressions, 
lower default spread is associated with fund’s bond holdings having more than mean 
covenants. Consonant with the differing investment strategies, High Yield funds allocate, on 
average, less 34.95% of their holdings to bonds with less than mean covenants. In fact, HY 
funds invest primarily in lower rated bonds, which often have more covenants attached.  
 
H4: Do Funds that allocate a higher percentage of their holdings to bonds with less than 
mean covenants have greater returns and attract more flows from investors? 
 
Table 8 shows that funds that allocate a higher percentage of their holdings in corporate bonds 
to bonds with less than mean covenants yield greater returns. The coefficient is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. A 1% change of the former, increases returns by 
0.002%, on average. This is a very significant magnitude when evaluated together with the 
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average returns of 0.29% earned by the sample funds. Additionally, Table 8 indicates that HY 
funds yield 0.22% greater average returns than the distinct funds. The results obtained are 
consistent with “cov-lite” contracts increased risks, compensated by higher beta returns, and 
HY funds allocating more of their assets to lower-rated bonds.  
 
On the other hand, Table 8 reports a positive, but insignificant, estimate for the effect of 
allocation to bonds with less than mean covenants on fund flows. It might be the case that the 
historically low yield levels have reduced the documented impact of covenants on the cost of 
debt (Reisel 2014). As such, the indirect effect of bond covenants on future flows independent 
of past returns, via higher yields, might get offset. Regarding the control variables, positive 
past year average net flows predict greater future inflows. The same tendency is found for 
increased past performance. The positive and significant estimate for past squared returns 













 Can Bond Funds demand explain the surge in Cov-lite Corporate Bonds? 
  27 
9. Alternative Estimation Methods 
 
Table 9 reports estimates from the Logistic regression, where the dependent variable is a 
covenant dummy, which equals 1 in case the number of covenants in place for a bond is above 
the mean. The independent variables are kept the same. The coefficients of interest are in the 
majority statistically significant. The sign of the estimates remains unchanged, providing 
further evidence on the robustness of the results. Regression (1) of Table 9 refutes, however, 
that higher trading volume increases the likelihood of bonds in the full sample having less than 
mean covenants. H2 is once again rejected across all model specifications. As guidance, the 
exponentiated logistic coefficients are interpreted as the expected change in the odds ratio6. As 
such, for each 1% increase in the yield slope, the odds of a bond having more than mean 
covenants increases by 23.4% (= exp (0.21)). 
 
Following Bazzana, Zadorozhnaya and Gabriele (2018), I further cross-check the Poisson and 
Logistic results with the OLS estimates calculated by regressing the same predictors over the 
“covenant protection index” in Table 10. The F-test confirms that the independent variables 
are jointly statistically significant at the 1% level. The sign and significance of all regressors, 
including the controls, are the same as the ones reported by Poisson. In particular, Regression 
(2) documents a negative and significant estimate for the log trading volume. This estimate 
was negative but insignificant in the Poisson and Logistic regressions for HY bonds. 
Specifically, for a 10% increase in the trading volume, the “covenant protection index” for HY 
bonds is expected to decrease by -0.46% (= -4.78*ln (1.1)). All in all, the OLS results 
corroborate H1, particularly for HY bonds, and reject H2.  
 
6 𝑂𝑑𝑑𝑠 = 	 !
"#!
, where p is the probability of an event occurring; 𝑂𝑑𝑑𝑠	𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 = 	$%%&!
$%%&"
, where 𝑂𝑑𝑑𝑠"adds to the 
predictor variable one-unit. 
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10. Research Limitations 
 
The first limitation of this empirical study is attributing equal importance to the different bond 
covenants. As noted by Brockman et al. (2018), certain firm activities are subject to a higher 
number of restrictions. As such, regression analyses based solely on the total number of 
covenants, overlook the fact that most of these restrictions mitigate the same agency problem. 
To overcome this concern, a few papers report together with the total number of covenants, a 
covenant intensity regressand. The former identifies whether the bond places restrictions on 
any of the three following main categories: restrictions on financing, investment, and payouts. 
 
The second, and most impactful, limitation of this research is the non-inclusion of firm-level 
controls in the regressions at the bond-level. As previously documented, bondholders demand 
more covenants the near the firm is to financial distress. Frequently used metrics of financial 
distress include leverage, interest coverage, and profitability (Miller and Reisel 2012). These 
variables are available at Compustat. Though, merging them with FISD based on the cusip 
yields no matching results. This is because the cusip does not consider mergers and 
acquisitions, requiring a very demanding manual match of the data by company name.  
 
At last, I consider trading volume when proxying liquidity in the U.S. Corporate Bond Market. 
Trading activity variables are commonly used in the literature. However, more robust and 
complex liquidity measures, such as the Amihud and Roll measures, have been shown to better 
capture liquidity effects (Friewald et al. 2012). Choi and Kronlund (2017), for instance, use the 
Amihud measure on their time-series analysis of the impact of market liquidity in “RFY”. 
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11. Conclusion 
 
In this research, I have analyzed in-depth the effect of Bond Funds’ demand in the surge of 
“cov-lite” contracts. I show that bonds issued in periods of low interest rates tend to have fewer 
covenants. I find, however, no evidence of bonds owned to a greater extent by Bond Funds, to 
have fewer covenants. As such, no direct link can be established between funds “RFY” when 
interest rates are low, and the increasing issuance of bonds with fewer covenants. Nonetheless, 
I confirm that funds tilt their portfolios towards corporate bonds with less than mean covenants 
when interest rates are low and market liquidity is high. In line with the increased risk-taking, 
funds generate significantly higher returns from this strategy. Across Bond Funds, High Yield 
funds allocate, on average, relatively less of their holdings in corporate bonds to bonds with 
less than mean covenants and have better monthly performance. Such results are consistent 
with High Yield funds investing primarily in lower-rated bonds, which often have more 
covenants attached and offer higher yields.  
 
Future research on the same topic can benefit from addressing this study’s limitations. This 
includes adding to the analysis: 1) Covenant Intensity Indicator; 2) Firm-Level Control 
Variables; 3) Improved Liquidity Proxy. Furthermore, Credit Quality Deterioration in the U.S. 
Corporate Bond Market is not limited to the surge in “cov-lite” contracts. The default risk 
premium has been at historically low levels. It is thus of great relevance to investigate whether 
this phenomenon can be attributed to the increasing participation of Bond Funds in the U.S. 
Corporate Bond Market. Also important, is to analyze how the evidenced negative relationship 
between bond covenants and yields has changed since the 2006 version of FISD reported by 
Reisel (2014). One and the other directions for future research will enhance academic’s 
understanding of the recent market shift towards more issuer friendly terms. 
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Appendix 
Figure 1: U.S. Corporate Bond Issuance (Non-Convertible & Convertible) in USD Billions. 
 
Source: Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIMFA). 
Figure 2: U.S. Non-Convertible Corporate Bond Issuance (Investment-Grade & High Yield) 
in USD Billions. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Bond Issues Data. 
This table reports descriptive statistics for the sample bonds from FISD. The paper sample is 
composed of 17 530 bond issues, segmented between the period before and after the financial 
crisis of 2008. It excludes all bonds issued before 2003 and for which no offering date, offering 
amount, maturity date, coupon, or covenant information is provided. Also, it only considers 
issues of bond type CDEB (US Corporate Debentures), USBN (US Corporate Note), CMTN 




Nº of Issues % of Total Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev.
Full Sample 17 530 100% 828 855 102.8 1 142 1 185 183.1
Investment Grade 8 733 49.8% 429 418 49.4 560 582 102.7
- AAA 132 0.8% 13 11 6.7 5 3 5
- BBB- 1 480 8.4% 54 56 11.2 105 107 30.1
High Yield 8 797 50.2% 399 427 94.5 582 604 100
Senior Debt 17 216 98.2% 808 835 99.2 1 125 1 159 178.7
Junior Debt 309 1.8% 20 17 9.5 17 17 11.2
Low Maturity (< 5 Years) 2 184 12.5% 2.83 3 0.9 3 3 0.8
Mid Maturity ([5.15]) 12 912 73.7% 8.3 9 2.2 8 8 2.1
High Maturity (> 15 Years) 2 434 13.9% 31 30 8.1 30 30 6.6
Offering Amount (in thousands) - - 514 582 350 000 531 692 716 776 500 000 656 877
Coupon (%) - - 6.6% 6.3% 2.5% 4.8% 4.4% 2.3%
U.S. 15 094 86.1% - - - - - -
Canada 433 2.5% - - - - - -
Others 2 003 11.4% - - - - - -
Industrial 11 147 63.6% - - - - - -
Finance 3 922 22.4% - - - - - -
Utility 2 091 11.9% - - - - - -
Government 56 0.3% - - - - - -
Miscellaneous 312 1.8% - - - - - -
Full Sample 
(N = 17 530)
Sub-Sample (2003-2009)
(N = 11 649)
Sub-Sample (2010-2019)
(N = 5 881)
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Bond Funds Data. 
The following tables report descriptive statistics for the sample Bond Funds from Morningstar. 
The sample consists of 33 540 observations from 1 241 unique funds. It excludes all funds 
whose holdings did not sum up to close 100 on the same date. All holdings data reported outer 
of a quarter-end month are removed. Finally, only holdings of type B (Corporate Bond) and 5 
(Bond-Corporate Bond) are preserved. 
Panel A: Portfolio Holdings – High Yield Funds and Others. 
 




Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev.
Weight in Corporate Bonds 49.28 46.87 34.66 84.64 88.3 63.99 38.45 34.18 25.68
Allocation to Bonds with 
Less Than Mean Covenants
54.60 56.55 34.54 26.78 23.15 24.59 63.12 68.55 32.61
Return (% Monthly) 0.29 0.24 1.39 0.43 0.54 1.97 0.25 0.19 1.16
Total Net Assets ($M) 2 484.67 438.14 10 589.46 1 269.95 359.44 2 668.6 2 856.77 466.82 11 988.2
Flows ($M Monthly) 11.59 0.12 253 -2.68 -0.1 80.74 15.96 0.26 285
Expense Ratio (% Monthly) 0.4 0.37 4.17 0.51 0.71 1.86 0.36 0.3 4.66
Full Sample 
(N = 33 540)
High Yield Funds
(N = 7 865)
Others
(N = 25 675)
Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev.
Weight in Corporate Bonds 45.82 38.45 29.43 47.95 42.93 37.85
Allocation to Bonds with 
Less Than Mean Covenants 63.53 76.31 36.66 50.21 50.21 32.55
Return (% Monthly) 0.45 0.45 1.78 0.21 0.17 1..15
Total Net Assets ($M) 1401.24 309.26 6306.18 3 017.85 550.188 12 119.93
Flows ($M Monthly) 11.29 0.5 143.06 11.73 1.64 291.70
Expense Ratio (% Monthly) 0.58 0.58 7.07 0.31 0.29 1.17
Sub-Sample (2003-2009)
(N = 11 062)
Sub-Sample (2010-2019)
(N = 22 478)
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for the 8 Major Covenant Categories. 
The following table provides descriptive statistics for the 8 major covenant categories. The 
sample is composed of the 17 530 bond issues from FISD. Relative frequencies are computed 
using a dummy variable which equals 1 in case the bond has any covenant of that type. 
 
Types of Covenants Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max FISD Variables
All Restrictive Covenants
Nº of Covenants 6.75 6 4.59 0 22 37
Relative Frequency 99.3% 1 0.08 0 1
Borrowing Restrictions
Nº of Covenants 2.17 2 1.8 0 9 14
Relative Frequency 72.95% 1 0.44 0 1
- Restrictions on Liens
Nº of Covenants 0.74 1 0.62 0 3 3
Relative Frequency 65.13% 1 0.48 0 1
- Restrictions on Indebtedness Issuer
Nº of Covenants 0.65 1 0.65 0 3 6
Relative Frequency 55.1% 1 0.5 0 1
- Restrictions on Indebtedness Subsidiary
Nº of Covenants 0.78 1 0.83 0 3 5
Relative Frequency 55.6% 1 0.5 0 1
Asset &Inv. Restrictions
Nº of Covenants 1.19 1 1 0 6 6
Relative Frequency 78% 1 0.41 0 1
- Restrictions on Asset Sales
Nº of Covenants 0.95 1 0.62 0 3 3
Relative Frequency 77.86% 1 0.42 0 1
- Restrictions on CAPEX
Nº of Covenants 0.02 0 0.19 0 2 2
Relative Frequency 1.7% 0 0.13 0 1
- Restrictions on Affiliate Transactions
Nº of Covenants 0.21 0 0.41 0 1 1
Relative Frequency 20.71% 0 0.41 0 1
Restrictions on Payments
Nº of Covenants 0.52 0 1.04 0 3 3
Relative Frequency 22.36% 0 0.42 0 1
Restrictions on Stock Issuance
Nº of Covenants 0.21 0 0.54 0 3 4
Relative Frequency 15.23% 0 0.36 0 1
Restrictions on Anti-Takeover
Nº of Covenants 1.32 1 0.63 0 2 2
Relative Frequency 90.98% 1 0.29 0 1
Restrictions on Default
Nº of Covenants 0.88 1 0.6 0 2 2
Relative Frequency 75.1% 1 0.43 0 1
Restrictions on Profit/Net Worth
Nº of Covenants 0.46 0 0.86 0 3 5
Relative Frequency 23.1% 0 0.42 0 1
Restrictions on Rating
Nº of Covenants 0.01 0 0.09 0 1 1
Relative Frequency 0.9% 0 0.09 0 1
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Figure 3: Average Number of Covenants in Sample (High Yield and Investment-Grade). 
 











2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019












2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Restrictions on Borrowing Restrictions on Asset Sales & Inv
Restrictions on Payments Restrictions on Stock Issuance
Restrictions on Anti-Takeover Restrictions on Default
Restrictions on Profit/Net Worth Restrictions on Rating
 Can Bond Funds demand explain the surge in Cov-lite Corporate Bonds? 
  38 
Figure 5: Relative Frequency of Borrowing Restrictions and Restrictions on Asset Sales & 
Investment by sub-categories. 
 













































Restrictions on Indebtedness Issuer










































Restrictions on Asset Sales & Inv.
Restrictions on Asset Sales
Restrictions on CAPEX
Restrictions on Affiliate Transactions









2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Full Sample High Yield Investment Grade Linear (High Yield)
 Can Bond Funds demand explain the surge in Cov-lite Corporate Bonds? 
  39 
Figure 7: Annual Average of Bond Covenants with Yield Slope and Default Spread. 
 
Source: Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIMFA). 
Figure 8: Annual Average of Bond Covenants with Average Daily Trading Volume in the U.S. 
Corporate Bond Market. 
 




















2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

















2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Full Sample High Yield Trading Volume
 Can Bond Funds demand explain the surge in Cov-lite Corporate Bonds? 
  40 
Figure 9: Quarterly Average of Bond Covenants with Funds Ownership of U.S. Corporate 
Bonds. 
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Linear (Asset Allocation to Bonds with less than mean covenants)
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Table 4: Bond-Level Variables Description and Units of Measurement. 
 
 





Yield Slope 30-Year Treasury Rate minus 1-Year Treasury Rate (in Percent)
Default Spread BBB minus AAA U.S. Corporate Index (in Percent)
Trading Volume Average Daily Trading Volume (in Billions)
Fund_Weight_In_Bond Percentage of a bond held by each fund from Morningstar (in Percent)
Fund-Level Controls:
Offering AMT Par Value of debt initially offered (in Thousands)
Maturity Length of time until the maturity date (in Years)
Coupon Current annual interest rate paid on the bond (in Percent)
Rating Rating assigned to the bond (Scale from 1 (AAA) to 27 (NR))
Country-Level Controls
Inflation Inflation as measured by the Consumer Price Index (Annual %)
GDP Growth Annual GDP growth rate at market prices (Annual %)
Industry Group Industry Group to which the issuer belongs (Code 1 to 4)
Variables Description
Allocation to Bonds with 
Less than Mean Covenants
Allocation to bonds with less than 6.75 covenants (in % of Holdings in Corporate Bonds)
Yield Slope 30 Year Treasury minus 1 Year Treasury  (in Percent)
Default Spread BBB minus Aaa U.S. Corporate Index (in Percent)
Trading Volume Average Daily Trading Volume (in Billions)
Fund-Level Controls:
HY Fund Dummy = 1 if High Yield Fund, 0 otherwise
Size Monthly Total Assets under Management (in Dollars)
Expense Ratio Monthly Rate of Assets deducted each fiscal year for fund expenses (in Percent)
Net Flows Monthly Estimate of the money put in or withdrawn by fund investors (in % of Size)
Returns Monthly Returns (in Percent)
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Table 6: Number of Covenants: Cross-Sectional Evidence. 
This table reports the Poisson coefficients for the relation between number of covenants and 
Interest Rate Environment, Market Liquidity, and Funds Participation in the U.S. Corporate 
Bond Market. The regressors are described in Table 4. Robust standard errors are displayed in 







































































































Observations 16 723 16 723 16 723 8 305 8 418












Dependent Variable: Full Sample
Number of Covenants
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Table 7: Allocation to bonds with less than mean covenants: Time-Series Evidence. 
This table reports the OLS coefficients of allocation to bonds with less than mean covenants 
on the Interest Rate Environment and Market Liquidity. The regressors are described in Table 
5. Robust standard errors are displayed in parenthesis. ***, ** and * represent significance 

















High Yield Fund Dummy - -34.95***(0.705)
Log Size - -2.44***(0.186)
Expense Ratio - 0.1***(0.026)







Allocation to bonds with less than mean covenants Dependent Variable:
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Table 8: Fund Returns and Fund Flows on Allocation to bonds with less than mean covenants. 
This table reports the OLS estimates for the relation between fund returns or fund flows and 
allocation to bonds with less than mean covenants. The original merged Morningstar sample 
of 33 589 observations gets reduced to 29 969 observations due to the inclusion of lagged 
variables. The regressors are described in Table 5. Robust standard errors are displayed in 





(1) (2) (1) (2)
Allocation to bonds with less 










High Yield Fund Dummy - 0.22***(0.018) -
0.13
(0.097)
Log Size (past quarter) - 0.00***(0.001) -
-0.02***
(0.005)
Expense Ratio (past quarter) - 0.07***(0.010) -
-0.10
(0.113)
Net Flows (past year average) - 0.05***(0.079) -
1.01***
(0.098)
Returns (past quarter) - - - 0.10(0.083)




Observations 29 969 29 969 29 969 29 969










Fund ReturnsDependent Variable: Fund Flows
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Table 9: Covenant Dummy: Cross-Sectional Evidence. 
The following table reports the coefficients from the Logistic regression of Covenant Dummy 
on Interest Rate Environment, Market Liquidity, and Funds Participation in the U.S. Corporate 
Bond Market. The covenant dummy takes the value of 1 in case the number of covenants in 
place for a bond is above the mean. The regressors are described in Table 4. Robust standard 
errors are displayed in parenthesis. ***, ** and * represent significance levels of 1%, 5% and 
10%, respectively.  
 







































































Observations 16 723 8 305 8 418
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Table 10: Covenant Protection Index: Cross-Sectional Evidence. 
This table reports estimates from the OLS regression of Covenant Protection Index on Interest 
Rate Environment, Market Liquidity, and Funds Participation in the U.S. Corporate Bond 
Market. The Covenant Protection Index is obtained by dividing the number of covenants in a 
bond by the 37 conceivable covenants.  The regressors are described in Table 4. Robust 
standard errors are displayed in parenthesis. ***, ** and * represent significance levels of 1%, 
5% and 10%, respectively.  
 

















































Observations 16 723 8 305
R2 0.262 0.19
F test
189.8
(0.000)
-4 968
(0.000)
Covenant Protection Index
Dependent Variable:
